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Non-technical summary
In this paper we use survey responses of mayors from cities and municipalities in the
German state of Baden-Württemberg to study the “true” spatial structure of local tax
competition. The size of the jurisdiction and, in particular, its economic function turn
out to be the important determinants of the decision-maker’s perception of the intensity
of competition. In particular, respondents from urban centres perceive a much higher
intensity of competition for firms with respect to competing jurisdictions which are distant
or even located in other countries. Our empirical findings confirm the assumption of
the empirical literature about the importance of neighbourhood competition, but it also
shows that another important factor is missing. In particular, the assumption of the
empirical literature that competition takes place only among neighbours is at odds with
the theoretical approaches where all jurisdictions compete simultaneously. The existing
standard models, however, are incapable of explaining the empirical particularities of local
competition.
These empirical findings motivate our sequential tax competition model which consi-
ders a rich competition structure. Essentially, we assume a number of metropolitan regions
which each consist of one city centre and a number of surrounding (rural) jurisdictions.
The model has two levels of competition for mobile capital: first, cities simultaneous-
ly compete for mobile capital by setting their tax policies (which can be interpreted as
competition for large scale investments, such as headquarters); second, rural areas com-
pete simultaneously for capital within their metropolitan area (which corresponds to the
neighbourhood competition).
We are especially interested in the effects of a rise in the number of metropolitan
regions, which represents the increase in external competition, for example through glo-
balisation, Eastern enlargement of the EU or German unification. It is shown that –
similarly to standard models – the capital tax rates of the cities converge to zero, but
they stay positive for the hinterlands. Moreover, cities are more affected by an increase in
external competition than hinterlands, since they reduce capital tax rates more and shift
more from mobile capital to immobile labour taxation. In contrast to existing models,
our results imply that larger jurisdictions do not necessarily rely more on capital taxes in
case they face strong competition with more distant competitors. Based on tax data from
Baden-Württemberg, we show that several of the predictions from the sequential model
are in line with the development of tax rates in the past 20 years.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Wir nutzen Daten aus einer Umfrage unter baden-württembergischen Bürgermeistern um
die “reale” räumliche Struktur des lokalen Steuerwettbewerbs zu untersuchen. Die Größe
und vor allem die ökonomische Funktion der Städte und Gemeinden stellen sich als wichti-
ge Determinanten der Wahrnehmung des Wettbewerbsdrucks durch die Entscheidungsträ-
ger heraus. Vor allem Befragte aus urbanen Zentren nehmen eine wesentlich höhere Inten-
sität des Wettbewerbs um Firmenansiedlungen mit Kommunen in größerer Entfernung
oder im Ausland wahr. Unsere Befunde bestätigen zwar die Annahme der empirischen
Literatur hinsichtlich der Relevanz von Nachbarschaftswettbewerb, sie zeigen aber auch,
dass ein wichtiger Faktor ignoriert wird. Zudem steht die Annahme, dass Wettbewerb nur
zwischen Nachbarn stattfindet, im Widerspruch zu theoretischen Arbeiten, in denen alle
Gebietskörperschaften miteinander im Wettbewerb stehen. Diese Standardmodelle sind
jedoch nicht in der Lage, die empirischen Besonderheiten des lokalen Wettbewerbs zu
erklären.
Diese Befunde motivieren unser sequentielles Steuerwettbewerbsmodell, das eine kom-
plexe Wettbewerbsstruktur berücksichtigt. Wir unterstellen im Wesentlichen zahlreiche
Metropolregionen, die jeweils aus einer Stadt und einer Anzahl an umgebenden (ländli-
chen) Gemeinden bestehen. Das Modell umfasst zwei Ebenen des Wettbewerbs um Ka-
pital: Erst konkurrieren Städte simultan miteinander über ihre Steuerpolitik (dies kann
als Wettbewerb um große Investitionen, wie Unternehmenszentralen, angesehen werden).
Danach konkurrieren ländliche Gebiete um den Kapitalstock ihrer Region (dies entspricht
dem Nachbarschaftswettbewerb).
Uns interessiert vor allem der Effekt einer Erhöhung der Anzahl an Metropolregionen
auf die Steuersetzung; dies entspricht einer Verschärfung des externen Wettbewerbs, etwa
durch die Globalisierung, Osterweiterung der EU oder die deutsche Wiedervereinigung.
Es zeigt sich, dass – wie im Standardmodell – die Kapitalsteuern der Städte gegen Null
konvergieren; sie bleiben jedoch positiv für das Umland. Zudem sind die Städte stärker
von einer Verschärfung des externen Wettbewerbs betroffen, da sie ihre Kapitalsteuern
mehr absenken und stärker auf die Besteuerung des immobilen Faktors Arbeit zurückgrei-
fen müssen. Im Gegensatz zur bestehenden Literatur implizieren unsere Ergebnisse, dass
größere Gebietskörperschaften nicht notwendigerweise stärker auf Kapitalbesteuerung zu-
rückgreifen, falls sie sich einem starkem Wettbewerb mit weiter entfernten Wettbewerbern
ausgesetzt sehen. Abschließend zeigen wir, dass zahlreiche der Vorhersagen des Modells
mit der Entwicklung der Steuersätze in Baden-Württemberg in den letzten 20 Jahren in
Einklang stehen.
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1 Introduction
The governments of local jurisdictions compete for mobile resources, yet we know little
about the spatial structure of this competition. For example, the empirical literature has
focused on the analysis of spatial interactions. When these originate from inter-municipal
tax competition for mobile capital, researchers typically assume that the competitors of a
local community are mainly those jurisdictions in its close neighbourhood. Thus intensity
of competition is approximated by neighbourhood matrices (see Brueckner, 2003, and
Revelli, 2005, for surveys). If true, this assumption implies for theoretical modelling that
the tax reaction function of a community depends directly only on the tax rates of its
neighbouring jurisdictions. This, however, is incompatible with standard models of capital
tax competition where complete capital mobility is assumed and all jurisdictions compete
with each other in a simultaneous game (see, Wilson, 1999, for a survey; exceptions
discussed below).
The discrepancy between the empirical and theoretical literatures has important conse-
quences for our thinking about the effects of market integration or globalisation. Accord-
ing to the theoretical literature an increase in the number of jurisdictions or metropolitan
areas should lead to declining or even zero capital tax rates everywhere (assuming other
tax instruments with finite supply elasticities are available), while in the context of the
empirical model at most a rather small indirect effect should be found. Whether in the
long run tax rates on mobile factors become small or not has important long run con-
sequences for the distribution of income across factors of production and thus for the
political acceptance of market integration. Moreover, the viability of local government
finances is at stake, which is important as decentralised government decision making is
often considered desirable.
In this paper we make two novel contributions, one empirical and one theoretical, which
relate to the above discrepancy between theoretical and empirical models. First, based on
survey evidence from more than 700 mayors in the German state of Baden-Württemberg,
we study the “true” spatial structure of local tax competition by asking local politicians
who they actually consider to be their main competitors for mobile capital. This allows us
to identify empirically the reference group for local business tax policy decisions. The size
of the jurisdiction and in particular its economic function (based on categories from spatial
planning) turn out to be the important determinants of the decision-maker’s perception
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of the intensity of competition. Compared to non-urban municipalities, respondents from
urban centres (up to population of 600,000) perceive a much higher intensity of competi-
tion for firms in general, and especially with respect to competing jurisdictions which are
distant or even located in other countries. By contrast, mayors from smaller municipal-
ities (usually with populations of 1,000 to 10,000 inhabitants) regularly state that they
don’t compete with distant jurisdictions for mobile firms. Moreover, we find evidence that
jurisdictions in the direct neighbourhood are generally regarded as especially important
competitors. On the one hand, these findings confirm the assumption of the empirical
literature about the importance of neighbourhood competition; but, on the other hand,
it also shows that an important effect is left out.
Second, based on these empirical findings, we build a multi-stage tax competition
model with a rich competition structure. Our model assumes n metropolitan regions,
each of which consists of one urban centre and m surrounding jurisdictions called hinter-
lands. There are two levels of competition for mobile capital. First, cities simultaneously
compete for mobile capital by setting their tax policies, followed by capital movements to
a particular city. This represents the level of competition between non-neighbouring com-
munities identified in our survey. Second, after the cities’ tax choices, hinterlands compete
simultaneously for capital within their metropolitan area, taking the urban centre’s tax
rate and the total metropolitan capital supply as given (which is their own supply plus the
capital attracted by the city beforehand). This approximates the neighbourhood compe-
tition effect described above.1 One way to think about our sequential structure is to view
large cities as the primary competitors for large-scale investments, such as headquarters,
which are often accompanied by smaller investments (for example from suppliers or sub-
contractors). After the large-scale investment has been located in a city, the associated
suppliers and subcontractors have strong incentives to settle in a reasonable distance to
their client, i.e. in the same metropolitan region.2
1Therefore two commitment assumptions are built into our model: i) A city’s capital tax is fixed once
its hinterlands compete (but the city rationally anticipates competition from hinterlands), and ii) after
the cities’ tax competition game capital is mobile only within the city’s metropolitan region but not
beyond.
2This finding gets further empirical support from van Dijk and Pellenbarg (2000), who show that the
vast majority of firm relocations in the Netherlands occurs in form of short distance moves. Brueckner and
Saavedra (2001) argue why capital – although theoretically completely mobile at least within a country
– is supplied inelastically within a region and, thus, remains in the respective metropolitan region. For
instance, investment in specialised industries is strongly tied to a region. Moreover, closeness to suppliers
or selling markets as well as existing local networks are further reasons why firms may not respond
elastically after they are locked in a location.
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We then compare the outcome of the fiscal competition game from this model, called
the sequential model, to a traditional tax competition model in which all governments
decide simultaneously in an otherwise identical setup; this second model is called the
simultaneous model. We are particulary interested in the effects of a rise in the number
of metropolitan regions n, which approximates the increase in competition through glob-
alisation (or in Germany’s context the effects from Eastern enlargement of the EU and
German unification; more on this below). Our first result is a limit result and demon-
strates that in both types of models for a very large number of metropolitan regions
(n → ∞) capital tax rates in cities converge to zero, while for hinterlands the capital
tax rate goes to zero in the simultaneous model, but stays bounded above zero in the
sequential model. Secondly, in the sequential model an increase in n affects cities more
than hinterlands in two ways: i) cities reduce capital tax rates more than hinterlands
lower theirs, and ii) cities shift more from mobile capital taxation to immobile labour
taxation than hinterlands. Result i) does not hold in the simultaneous model, where in
cities the effect can be larger or smaller than in hinterlands and is typically close to zero
when evaluated numerically.
Our sequential model thus predicts that hinterlands are less affected than cities by
increasing competition from entry of metropolitan regions. As empirically hinterlands are
typically much smaller than urban centres, our model contrasts to research which has
shown that smaller countries and countries on the periphery have lower corporate tax
rates than large countries or regions in the core (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Haufler
et al., 2009; Haufler and Wooton, 2010). We then show, however, that several of our
predictions coming from the sequential model are in line with stylised facts about local
business tax rates in the German state of Baden-Württemberg, the same state on which
our survey draws. Local business tax rates in small jurisdictions are clearly not low and
sometimes even higher than in city centres. In addition, in recent years tax rates in
small jurisdictions in Baden-Württemberg have increased, whereas they have stagnated
in urban centres. Cities in turn have shifted tax burden much more to a less distortionary
property tax than small communities have. Our preferred explanation for the difference in
predictions and stylised facts is that competition between geographically close jurisdictions
at the local level is qualitatively different from competition among countries or states. At
the local level, but not at the country or state level, it is relatively easy for a firm to profit
from the agglomeration benefits and infrastructure of an urban centre, while enjoying the
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same legal and cultural context, and still be located just outside that jurisdiction for tax
reasons.
Our theoretical approach is related to several strands of literature. Few of the empirical
contributions on local tax competition (e.g., Buettner, 2001; Brueckner and Saavedra,
2001; Hauptmeier et al., 2012) enrich the empirical analyses with explicit theoretical
considerations. These contributions are based on standard tax competition models in the
tradition of the workhorse model by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and are modified
by restricting the number of competing jurisdictions. Capital is then completely mobile
within one region, but not at all mobile with respect to jurisdictions in other regions, so
that jurisdictions only compete for capital with jurisdictions from the same region. This
assumption, however, is refuted by our survey results at least for larger cities.
Comparable to our results is the finding that not all jurisdictions compete for capital
to the same degree, which appears in few theoretical papers that endogenise the number of
jurisdictions competing for mobile capital. The approaches by Jayet and Paty (2006) and
Matsumoto (2010) assume that local jurisdictions have to pay a development cost before
entering the competition for a mobile firm. Therefore, in equilibrium not all jurisdictions
enter competition for outside investment. The main focus of these papers is, thus, on the
overall number and not the type of jurisdictions that compete for an investment.
The theoretical tax competition literature has identified size differences (expressed as
differences in labour endowments) as a factor for explaining why different jurisdictions
are affected asymmetrically by tax competition (see Bucovetsky, 1991, and Wilson, 1991).
In these two-jurisdiction models, the small jurisdiction suffers a bigger outflow of capital
after an increase of its capital tax rate than the bigger competitor, so that the smaller
jurisdiction sets the lower tax rates than the bigger one.3 Yet, these works focus only
on the pure size effects and do not consider that larger urban centres might compete
with a different set of competitors for mobile capital and are hence faced with a different
competitive pressure than smaller rural areas.
Concerning the model structure, Gordon (1992) and Wang (1999) assume similar to
us a sequential timing with the bigger region moving first. They justify the structure
with the reasoning that in the real world the large region is likely to move first and
3Most recently, Bucovetsky (2009) shows that this result can be generalised for federations consisting
of more than two jurisdictions.
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the small region moves second. This assumption gets support from empirical evidence
on international corporate tax reforms (see e.g., Altshuler and Goodspeed, 2002, and
Redoano, 2007). Sequential game structures are also common in new economic geography
models for tax competition, such as in Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Borck and
Pflüger (2006). A new approach has been presented by Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010)
who endogenise the moves in a simple two-region tax competition model and find that in
their model the smaller region might have incentives to move first.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we present the findings from
our survey of local decision-makers in Baden-Württemberg which motivate our theoretical
model. In section 3, we introduce a sequential model, present the results and compare
them to a simultaneous model (shown in the appendix). Finally, in section 4 we discuss
the implications of the model for local tax setting and compare them with local business
tax rates in the German state of Baden-Württemberg.
2 The Spatial Structure of Competition – Perceptions
of Local Decision-Makers
The existing empirical literature on spatial interactions suggests that capital mobility
is highest between neighbouring jurisdictions. Spatial tax interaction is, for instance,
demonstrated for the local business tax for cities and municipalities in the German state
of Baden-Württemberg by Buettner (2001). Similar evidence for inter-municipal interac-
tions has been found for local business property taxes in the metropolitan area of Boston
(Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001) and the Canadian province of British Columbia (Brett
and Pinkse, 2000). Yet, evidence for spatial fiscal interaction is by itself not a sufficient
proof for the existence of capital tax competition that is induced by high capital mobility
between neighbouring jurisdictions. The observed patterns may also have other causes,
such as yardstick competition (see Revelli, 2005, for different explanations of spatial in-
teractions). In fact, the direct evidence for tax base mobility is mixed. Brett and Pinkse
(2000) as well as Brett and Tardif (2008) do not find any effect of neighbours’ levels of
business property tax rates on the tax base for a sample of municipalities in the Canadian
province of British Columbia. Some positive evidence comes from Buettner (2003), who
studies the tax base effect for the local business tax in the state of Baden-Württemberg.
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He only finds evidence for relatively small municipalities whose tax bases are positively
affected by the tax rates of their neighbours.
A survey therefore helps in finding out whether capital mobility between jurisdictions is
high. Decision-makers can only be expected to be responsive to taxes in other jurisdictions
if they believe that capital is mobile to these jurisdictions. We assume that these beliefs
can be regarded as proxies for the true mobility of firms as decision-makers are likely
to be well-informed about one of their most important revenue sources.4 Our survey
approach is similar to that of Heinemann and Janeba (2011) in focussing on political
decision makers. They study individual perceptions of members of the German parliament
(Bundestag) with respect to the intensity of international tax competition and find, inter
alia, a strong ideological bias.5 In this work, we shift the focus to the study of the
municipality characteristics to explain differences in the competitive pressures which are
perceived by politicians. We control for a possible ideological bias in the regressions.
2.1 Survey description and results
In this section, we examine the determinants of the competitive pressures which are
actually perceived by real world decision-makers at the local level. We focus on German
cities and municipalities in the state of Baden-Württemberg. The institutional setting in
this state is relevant because, as in all German states, the local level has autonomy over
the rates of two main tax instruments: (i) the local business tax (“Gewerbesteuer”) and
(ii) the land tax (“Grundsteuer B”). The former is levied directly on business earnings, so
that it can be regarded as a tax on capital and, as such, a highly mobile tax base.6 These
characteristics have already been exploited by empirical works which find strong evidence
for interactions between neighbouring jurisdictions in this state (see Buettner, 2001, and
Hauptmeier et al., 2012).
4We realise that beliefs about mobility do not necessarily have to be identical with real mobility,
and therefore decision-makers might build their decisions on wrong perceptions of the reality. Evidence
for this view comes from Brülhart and Parchet (2010), who demonstrate what they call “alleged” tax
competition for inheritance taxes in Swiss municipalities.
5A survey-based approach with respect to lower-tier decision-makers has until now only be applied by
Ashworth and Heyndels for Belgium municipalities. In contrast to our work, however, they focus on the
stated preferences for tax reforms (see Ashworth and Heyndels 1997, 2000), and not on the perceptions
and spatial structure of competitive pressures.
6Buettner (2003) argues that the business tax can be regarded as a capital income tax since the
definition of taxable business earnings does not only include profits but also a major part of interest
payments.
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For our purpose, we conducted a survey which we sent to the mayors of all 1108 cities
and municipalities of the state of Baden-Württemberg in May 2008 (see figure 5 in the
appendix for a map showing the location of the jurisdictions). Mayors are of particular
importance in the political system of this state due to the characteristics of the “South
German Council Constitution” (see Wehling, 2003, for an overview). They are elected
directly by the citizens and head the administration of the jurisdiction. Moreover, they
preside over the local council, for which they enjoy voting rights. The combination of ex-
ecutive authority and agenda setting power in the legislative generates a quasi-presidential
system with a strong position of the mayor and a rather weak council.
Our survey question of interest is the following: “With which cities and municipalities
do you perceive yourself to be in competition for businesses?”7 Respondents were asked
to assess the strength of competitive pressures on a discrete scale from -4 (not at all
regarded as competitors) to +4 (very strongly regarded as competitors) regarding three
types of jurisdictions: (Q1) cities and municipalities in Baden-Württemberg, (Q2) cities
and municipalities in other German states and (Q3) cities and municipalities in other
countries. The high response number of 714 (64.4% of all municipalities) provides us with
a sizeable sample for our empirical investigation. Unfortunately, the survey questions
do not allow us to disentangle the perceived intensity of competition with urban centres
and rural areas within the state of Baden-Württemberg. The responses given to the first
question confound the two channels discussed above, i.e. competition with neighbouring
municipalities as well as with more distant jurisdictions within the same state.8
First, we are interested in the effect of the jurisdiction size on the perceived com-
petitive pressure. The illustrations in figure 1 show the distributions of the responses
to the three survey questions conditional on the size of the jurisdictions. Jurisdiction
sizes are partitioned into deciles plus the twenty biggest jurisdictions of the state. All
three diagrams indicate that larger cities perceive the highest degree of competitive pres-
sures; however, this effect varies strongly depending on the reference group. Whereas
the perception of the intensity of competition with local competitors (within the state of
Baden-Württemberg) does not differ strongly for all size deciles, the perception depends
7The exact wording of this question in German is: “Mit welchen anderen Städten und Gemeinden
sehen Sie sich besonders im Wettbewerb um Unternehmensansiedlungen?”.
8We would have liked to ask for the exact identity of a jurisdiction’s competitors rather than using
this indirect question. In order to obtain a high response rate, however, we enlisted the support of the
cities’ joint representation organisation who did not allow us to ask such a direct question.
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Figure 1: Survey: distribution of responses
strongly on size when competition with more distant competitors is considered, that is
jurisdictions located in other German states or different countries (Q2 and Q3).
We proceed by studying the statistical significance of our descriptive findings in a SUR
(seemingly unrelated regressions) ordered probit model. The responses to the three survey
questions presented above serve as dependent variables. We choose a system estimator
because the individual error terms for all three questions are expected to be correlated
with each other. We control for a number of further municipal characteristics, in partic-
ular for the possible impact of the state’s fiscal equalisation system9 and an ideological
bias. The discussion of these control variables and the descriptive statistics of all variables
can be found in table 3 in the appendix. We apply two different measures to highlight the
differences between urban and rural areas. First, we insert the logarithm of a jurisdiction’s
number of inhabitants as explanatory variable. Second, we insert dummies for district
types, which are provided by the spatial planning programme of the state of Baden-
Württemberg (see LEP 2002, Wirtschaftsministerium Baden-Württemberg (2002)). This
categorisation classifies jurisdictions into three categories according to a number of spe-
cific characteristics and the functions they provide, such as infrastructure or education
9Theoretical considerations (e.g., Köthenbürger, 2003) and empirical evidence (e.g., Buettner, 2006)
suggest that transfers tend to alleviate the pressure from tax competition, so that municipalities which
receive a high share of transfers should generally be less concerned about inter-municipal competition.
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institutions. We insert dummies for the two highest groups of urban jurisdictions, i.e.
regional centres (“Oberzentrum”: the highest level, 16 cities) and secondary centres (“Mit-
telzentrum”: intermediate level, 95 cities); the baseline category is rural area (the location
of the regional and secondary centres is depicted in figure 5 in the appendix).
For the identification of neighbourhood effects, we use the proximity to subnational
(and international) borders as reference points. We insert dummies for those munici-
palities which share a border with another German state (Bavaria, Hesse or Rhineland-
Palatinate) or another country (France or Switzerland). We are especially interested in
the former group since there are no formal barriers to capital mobility between German
states.10 We are now in position to investigate whether border municipalities take neigh-
bourhood (to competitors in other states) into account in their perceptions of competitive
pressures.
Table 1: Results: perception of competition intensity – Seemingly unrelated ordered
probit regressions
Perception of competition intensity with jurisdictions:
(a) in Baden-Württemberg, (b) in other states, (c) in other countries
System (1) System (2)
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
Inhabitants (log)t−1 0.280*** 0.264*** 0.237*** – – –
(4.52) (4.51) (3.77)
Regional centre – – – 0.050 0.547*** 0.569***
(“Oberzentrum”) (0.26) (2.71) (2.98)
Secondary centre – – – 0.253* 0.468*** 0.414***
(“Mittelzentrum”) (1.90) (3.64) (2.98)
State border -0.021 1.016*** 0.205 0.003 1.013*** 0.208
(-0.14) (5.61) (1.43) (0.02) (5.58) (1.43)
Country border -0.187 -0.050 0.400** -0.189 -0.061 0.389**
(-1.29) (-0.31) (2.17) (-1.28) (-0.37) (2.09)
Mayor 0.097 0.133 0.124 0.026 0.093 0.093
(1.14) (1.61) (1.37) (0.32) (1.16) (1.06)
Share leftt -0.594 0.002 -0.331 -0.152 0.355 -0.023
(-1.34) (0.00) (-0.77) (-0.35) (0.88) (-0.06)
Share free voterst 0.125 0.133 -0.266 -0.038 -0.011 -0.395*
(0.56) (0.61) (-1.16) (-0.17) (-0.05) (-1.75)
High contribution ratet 0.058 -0.367*** -0.479*** -0.040 -0.447*** -0.549***
(0.39) (-2.63) (-3.00) (-0.28) (-3.27) (-3.48)
Medium contribution ratet 0.100 -0.176 -0.155 0.067 -0.207 -0.185
(0.72) (-1.33) (-1.05) (0.48) (-1.60) (-1.26)
Population working aget−1 -1.826* -0.486 -0.873* -1.348 -0.123 -0.592
(-1.79) (-0.56) (-1.84) (-1.23) (-0.13) (-1.20)
Unemployment ratet−1 2.589 5.129 5.224 13.946* 9.930 9.153
(0.34) (0.67) (0.62) (1.83) (1.36) (1.12)
Observations 716 715 716 716 715 716
Pseudo R-squared 0.013 0.034 0.028 0.006 0.032 0.027
z-values in parentheses: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
10The scale and scope of the mayors’ perceptions of cross-border competitive threat is studied in greater
detail in Geys and Osterloh (2011).
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The results are presented in table 1. First, the size effect which is apparent from figure
1 turns out to be statistically significant. Decision-makers in larger jurisdictions assess the
competition with more distant jurisdictions as much more intense than decision-makers
from smaller ones. This becomes even more evident in the second system of regressions
in which the district type dummies are used. Decision-makers in regional and secondary
centres perceive a much higher intensity of competition with respect to more distant
competitors (in other states or countries) than decision-makers in rural areas. Second, we
note that the perceived intensity of competition with municipalities from other German
states is significantly higher for those municipalities located adjacent to a state border –
and consequently for those jurisdictions that are direct neighbours of jurisdictions in other
states – than for non-border municipalities. With respect to international competition,
a neighbourhood effect can also be observed for those jurisdictions adjacent to a country
border, but this effect is much lower. These results confirm that nearest municipalities
perceive each other as very important competitors.
Out of the control variables, the only variables which show a strong impact are the
dummies which reflect the impact of the fiscal equalisation system (see the appendix for
more information on the control variables). This reflects that municipalities which benefit
from fiscal equalisation transfers are less concerned about competition. The political
variables, however, fail to show significant effects.
3 The Model
In this section we develop a multi-stage model of fiscal competition between many metro-
politan regions, each consisting of a city and several surrounding jurisdictions called hin-
terlands. Several important features of the model are consistent with the survey results
reported above: First, the findings for border regions support the assumption that capi-
tal has to be regarded as particularly mobile between directly neighbouring jurisdictions.
Second, larger cities, and in particular regional and secondary centres, also perceive a high
intensity of competition with more distant jurisdictions. This corroborates with recent
empirical evidence from the literature on competition for headquarters (see Strauss-Kahn
and Vives (2009) on the US and Becker et al. (2009) on Germany). While it is shown
for Germany that the vast majority of municipalities does not attract any headquarters,
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the literature also finds that headquarters are very mobile and that they are, inter alia,
attracted by low corporate taxes at the local level.11
We therefore assume two levels of competition: (1) competition among urban centres
for investments and (2) competition within a metropolitan region. We choose a sequential
structure of the tax-setting game. Initially, all urban areas or ‘cities’ – superscripted by
c – decide simultaneously on their tax rates, and the capital is allocated among cities.
Capital is thereafter bound to a city’s metropolitan region. Then, the hinterlands –
superscripted by h – follow in their tax setting, and the fixed supply of capital stock in
a metropolitan region i is allocated between the city in i and the hinterlands in i. We
believe that this sequencing captures best the two levels of competition. Any reversal of
the decision of cities and hinterlands would lead to a different competition structure. In
particular, hinterlands would then indirectly compete with all cities because hinterlands
would rationally have to anticipate how their tax policy decision affects all cities’ tax
choices, which is in contrast to our empirical findings.
One way to think about our sequential structure is as follows: Large cities are the
primary competitors for large-scale investment, such as headquarters, which are often
accompanied by smaller investment, such as those from suppliers or subcontractors. After
the large-scale investment has been located in a city and has thus committed to a certain
metropolitan region, the associated suppliers and subcontractors have strong incentives
to settle in a reasonable distance to their client, i.e. in the same metropolitan region.12
3.1 Model structure
The model builds on Borck (2003), who examines the choice of tax policy in a political
economy context with heterogeneous agents. He considers only one level of competition
and there is no distinction between cities and hinterlands. We extend his work in a
substantial way by considering the interaction between different types of jurisdictions in
a multi-stage game. The economy consists of n symmetric metropolitan regions indexed
11Similar evidence exists for different kinds of foreign investment. Evidence that mainly highly ag-
glomerated centres compete for foreign investment comes, e.g., from Guimarães et al. (2000) and is
summarised by Dembour (2008).
12And even the headquarter itself is sometimes mobile within a metropolitan region, perhaps due to tax
advantages. One example for such a behaviour is the German stock exchange (Deutsche Börse AG) which,
due to low local business tax, outsourced half of its staff to Eschborn, a small city (20,000 inhabitants)
only 7 kilometers away from its traditional headquarter in the financial centre of Frankfurt, in 2008.
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by i, each comprising one city and m symmetric hinterland municipalities indexed by j.
Hence, there are n(1 + m) jurisdictions in the economy. This structure is illustrated in
figure 2 for the case of 3 regions with each containing 3 hinterlands, i.e. n = 3, m = 3. Our
main interest is in determining how increases in n, interpreted as globalisation (for example
via German unification or integration of Eastern Europe into the European union), affect
equilibrium tax policy. Our model also allows us to analyse changes in the number of
hinterlands m, perhaps resulting from the merger of small localities, even though this is
not the main focus of our work in this paper.
Figure 2: Model structure
Output of a numeraire consumption good is produced using interjurisdictionally mobile
capital and immobile labour. In section 4, we apply our model in the context of Germany’s
localities and with some adjustments reinterpret the factor labour as land. For now, it
is easier to follow the standard tax competition approach and label the factors as capital
and labour. In each region i, the population share of all hinterlands together is denoted
as s, so that the population share of a city is 1−s. Each hinterland thus has a population
share of s/m. The parameter s is thus the size parameter known from the literature on
asymmetric tax competition: Bigger jurisdictions tend to have higer tax rates. In our
context a larger s should induce higher (lower) tax rates in hinterlands (cities). Capital
(expressed in per capita terms) is equally distributed between all jurisdictions in the
sense that cities and hinterlands in all regions have the same capital-labour endowment
k¯c,i = k¯h,ij = k¯. Capital use k in any particular jurisdiction may differ from this value
due to fiscal policy differences.
We assume that the production function is quadratic in order to keep the analysis
12
tractable, which in intensive form reads (we leave out city and hinterland subscripts when
no confusion is possible):
f(k) = ak − bk
2
2
. (1)
Some but not all of our qualitative results should hold for more general production func-
tions and we will point this out where applicable.
Each jurisdiction is populated by many consumers who differ in their capital and labour
endowment (which is explained in more detail below). Each individual consumes the
numeraire consumption good and a public good which is provided by its local government.
Preferences are assumed to be quasi-linear:
U(c, g) = c+ u(g) (2)
where c is the private consumption good, g the publicly provided private good – called
the public good in the following – and the partial derivatives obey u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0. We
assume that one unit of the private good can be transformed into one unit of the public
good. The public good is provided by the government and financed through two taxes: (i)
a distortionary tax per unit of capital levied at source t and (ii) a non-distortionary labour
tax τ . Given that labour is immobile and fixed in supply, the labour tax is effectively an
efficient lump sum tax.
Finally, we introduce an unequal endowment of labour and capital among individuals.
In every region, the factor e determines the individual per capita endowment of labour,
(1 + e), and capital, (1− e)k¯. The factor e has a zero mean but a non-zero median. The
heterogenous distribution of endowments ensures – equivalently to Borck (2003) – that
both tax instruments are used in equilibrium.13
We are now in a position to pin down an individual’s private consumption c, which
is financed from the return to the fixed factor labour plus the profits from the capital
endowment. The return to labour equals the residual output after payment for capital
use minus the labour tax:
c = (1 + e)[f(k)− (ρ+ t)k − τ ] + (1− e)ρk¯, (3)
13This intentionally contrasts with much of the earlier literature (such as Bucovetsky and Wilson,
1991) which predicts the complete disuse of the distortionary tax in small jurisdictions as soon as a
non-distortionary tax becomes available.
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where ρ = f ′(k)− t is the net return to capital.
The public good is financed by taxing capital and labour:
g = tk + τ, (4)
which represents the government budget constraint. The marginal rate of transformation
between public and private good is assumed to be one.
The game structure can be summarised as follows:
In the first stage, all n cities determine simultaneously their capital and labour tax
rates {tc,i, τ c,i}i=1,...,n. Each city takes the tax rates in all other cities as given. In addition,
in each city the tax policy tuple must be the outcome of a majority rule voting process
where voters take into account how the city’s tax policy affects subsequent play.
In the second stage, capital is completely mobile between cities. A city i obtains a per
capita capital stock of k˜i, which depends on the tax policy vector from stage 1. The net
return on capital is equalised across metropolitan regions, where the net return captures
correctly the outcome of the game among hinterlands in region i. Together with the
capital endowments of the hinterlands this determines the overall capital stock available
in a metropolitan region in stages 3 and 4.
In the third stage, all hinterlands of metropolitan region i choose simultaneously their
tax policies, {th,ij, τh,ij}j=1,...,m. Each hinterland takes the city’s tax rates {tc,i, τ c,i} and
the tax policy of all other hinterlands in the same metropolitan region as given. In each
hinterland tax policy forms a majority rule voting equilibrium, taking subsequent choices
into account.
In the fourth and final stage, capital within a metropolitan region i is allocated between
the city and its hinterlands, so that kc,i and kh,ij result, based on tc,i and th,ij. The net
returns to capital between the city and its hinterlands in the same region are equalised. At
this stage, capital can only flow within a metropolitan area by assumption. Since labour
taxes do not distort the capital allocation, their levels are determined by the difference
between the public good demand and the funds provided from the taxation of capital via
(4). Production and consumption take place, and the government provides the public
good in all jurisdictions.
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In the following, the model is solved via backward induction, starting with the final
stage of the game.
3.2 Solving the model
3.2.1 Stage 4
We now solve the final stage for a typical metropolitan region i and drop the index
whenever possible to simplify notation. In the final stage, capital used in a city and its
hinterland areas depend on the respective capital tax rates of those jurisdictions (tc, th,j).
The overall supply of capital which is available in any given metropolitan region consists
of the initial endowment of the hinterlands, which is k¯ per jurisdiction, and the capital
stock that is available in the city, k˜i (which comes out of stage 2). The capital market
equilibrium condition can be written
(1− s)kc + s
m
m∑
j=1
kh,j = (1− s)k˜ + sk¯. (5)
Recall that s is the population share of all hinterlands in a metro region.
In equilibrium, the net return to capital, ρ = f ′(k)− t, has to be identical in the city
and every municipality in the hinterland:
ρ = a− bkc − tc = a− bkh,j − th,j (6)
Combining (5) and (6) gives the capital stock in a city
kc({th,j}j, tc, k˜) = sk¯ + (1− s)k˜ + s
b
(∑m
j=1 t
h,j
m
− tc
)
, (7)
and its hinterlands
kh,j({th,j}j, tc, k˜) = sk¯ + (1− s)k˜ + (1− s)t
c
b
+
s
∑
l 6=j t
h,l − (m− s)th,j
mb
, (8)
as functions of capital tax rates, the capital supply in the metro area and exogenous
parameters. Note that in both expressions the first two terms denote the capital supply
within the metropolitan region and the last two terms capture the adjustment due to
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tax differentials between the city and the municipalities in the hinterland. For both (7)
and (8), an increase in the own tax rate lowers the amount of capital employed, while an
increase in another jurisdiction’s tax rate increases capital use; in particular, we obtain
∂kh,j
∂th,j
=
s−m
mb
< 0.
It is easy to see that after inserting (7) and (8) into (6) the net return to capital is
declining in any jurisdiction’s tax rate. For example, we get
∂ρ
∂th,j
= −s/m < 0.
3.2.2 Stage 3
We now solve for the tax policy equilibrium within a metropolitan region, given the tax
policy of the city and capital stocks determined in stage 2 for that city (tc and k˜, omitting
city index i). Since fiscal policy in each hinterland must be a political equilibrium, we
follow Persson and Tabellini (2000) and (omitting hinterland indices) rewrite the utility
function of a voter with endowment e after substituting (3) and (4) into (2) as
U((t, τ); e) = J(t, τ) + eH(t, τ),
where
J(t, τ) = f(k)− (ρ+ t)k − τ + ρk¯ + u(tk + τ),
H(t, τ) = f(k)− (ρ+ t)k − τ − ρk¯,
and k is the capital stock of the hinterland community as given by (8), which in turn
depends on t and τ . The intermediate preferences condition (see Grandmont, 1978) can
be applied if voter utility can be written as a function of the idiosyncratic term e, where
the constant J(t, τ) and the slope parameter H(t, τ) are common to all voters and the
term involving e is monotonic in e. Consequently, the equilibrium tax rates depend on the
capital endowment of the median voter, eˆ. In the standard case of equal endowments of
all citizens within each jurisdiction, i.e. eˆ = 0, the median voter would only use the non-
distortionary labour tax and set the rate of the distortionary capital tax to zero (assuming
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no terms of trade argument). We will show below that in our model an equilibrium with
positive tax rates for both tax instruments occurs only if we assume that the distribution
of the capital endowment is skewed to the right, so that eˆ > 0. This seems empirically
reasonable. Furthermore, it is assumed that eˆ is identical in all cities and hinterlands.
The preferred policy of the median person in hinterland j of metropolitan region i
is derived by maximising utility function (2) with respect to th,ij and τh,ij, subject to
individual budget constraint (3), government budget constraint (4), and the capital stock
functions (7) and (8), where (8) is substituted into (3) and (4). The two first order
conditions are (index i is omitted):
−(1 + eˆ)f ′′(kh,j)∂k
h,j
∂th,j
kh,j + (1− eˆ) ∂ρ
∂th,j
k¯ + u′(gh,j) ·
(
kh,j + th,j
∂kh,j
∂th,j
)
= 0 (9)
and
u′(gh,j)− (1 + eˆ) = 0. (10)
Equation (10), the first order condition from optimising over the labour tax, fixes
the supply of the public good as function of the median’s endowment parameter eˆ. The
number of hinterlands or their joint population share s does not matter. The provision is
efficient if the distribution of capital-labour endowments is not skewed (i.e., eˆ = 0).
After inserting the comparative-static results reported at the end of stage 4, as well
as (8) into (9), and assuming a symmetric equilibrium for all hinterlands, we obtain a
reaction function th,j(tc, k˜) for a typical hinterland jurisdiction with respect to the city’s
capital tax:
th(tc, k˜) =
(
s
m− s2
)[
(1− s)
(
bk˜ + tc
)
+
bk¯[eˆ− 1 + s(1 + eˆ)]
(1 + eˆ)
]
. (11)
Note that a hinterland’s capital tax is increasing in the city’s tax rate and capital stock:
∂th
∂tc
> 0 and ∂th
∂k˜
> 0. In addition, for given k˜ and tc, the hinterland’s capital tax rate
goes to zero as the number of hinterland communities m converges to infinity. In that
situation, hinterlands use only the nondistortionary labour tax.14
Next, we insert the reaction function (11) into kc({th,j}, tc, k˜) and kh,j({th,j}, tc, k˜)
14It is true that the hinterland tax rate on capital is not zero when the capital distribution is not
skewed due to terms of trade considerations in the capital market. This result holds for a given tax rate
of the city, which is, however, endogenous and itself depends on e.
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from stage 4 to obtain the capital allocations kc and kh (now the same in all hinterlands):
kh(tc, k˜) =
(1− s)(m− s)
(m− s2)
[
tc
b
+ k˜
]
+
k¯s [m(1 + eˆ)− 2s+ 1− eˆ]
(1 + eˆ)(m− s2) (12)
and
kc(tc, k˜) =
m(1− s)
(m− s2) k˜ −
s(m− s)
b(m− s2)t
c +
k¯s[m(1 + eˆ) + (eˆ− 1)s]
(1 + eˆ)(m− s2) . (13)
As expected, a higher capital tax rate in the city increases capital use in hinterlands and
lowers it in the city (∂kh
∂tc
> 0, ∂k
c
∂tc
< 0). In addition, a bigger capital supply increases
capital employed everywhere (∂kh
∂k˜
> 0, ∂kc
∂k˜
> 0).
The labor tax follows from the government budget constraint τh = gh− thkh, where gh
is determined by (10), as argued above. The net return to capital in metropolitan region
i can be determined by substituting (11) and (12) into (6):
ρ(tc,i, k˜i) = a− m(1− s)[bk˜
i + tc,i]
(m− s2) −
k¯sb[m(eˆ+ 1) + s(eˆ− 1)]
(1 + eˆ)(m− s2) . (14)
This net return incorporates the strategic interaction of hinterlands for a given capital
supply and city capital tax rate in region i.
3.2.3 Stage 2
We now consider the interaction of tax setting and investment decisions across metropoli-
tan regions. In stage 2, equilibrium in the capital market across cities is considered for
a given vector of cities’ tax policies. In the location decision, capital owners correctly
anticipate how subsequently competition among hinterlands affects the net return in a
region. Since capital is perfectly mobile between all cities, the capital allocation has to
entail the equalisation of the net returns to capital
ρ = a− bkc,i − tc,i = a− bkc,v − tc,v (15)
for any pair of cities v 6= i. In equation (15), the capital stock as derived in (13) enters as
this is the amount of capital a city obtains given the cities’ tax policies. Condition (15)
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implies for any two cities that
kc,v =
bkc,i + tc,i − tc,v
b
. (16)
In addition, the capital market of the cities has to be in equilibrium, which now applies
to the capital stocks determined at stage 2:
k˜i +
∑
v 6=i
k˜v = nk¯ (17)
Combining (13), (16) and (17), we can solve for k˜i:
k˜i(tc,1, ..., tc,n) = k¯ −
(
n− 1
nb
)
tc,i +
1
nb
∑
v 6=i
tc,v. (18)
We may now determine the capital stocks in cities and hinterlands as a function of cities’
capital tax rates only by inserting (18) into (11)-(13):
kc,i =
(1− s)mT−i − [m(n− 1) + s(m− ns)]tc,i
bn(m− s2) +
k¯[m(1 + eˆ) + (eˆ− 1)s2]
(1 + eˆ)(m− s2) , (19)
kh =
(m− s)(1− s)T
bn(m− s2) +
k¯[m(1 + eˆ) + s2(eˆ− 1)− 2eˆs]
(m− s2)(1 + eˆ) , (20)
th =
s(1− s)T
n(m− s2) +
2beˆk¯s
(1 + eˆ)(m− s2) , (21)
where T =
∑n
i=1 t
c,i is the sum of all cities’ capital tax rates and T−i =
∑
v 6=i t
c,v is the
sum of all cities’ tax rates without city i. In addition, the net return to capital is found
by substituting (18) into (14) and rearranging terms:
ρ(tc,1, ..., tc,n) = a− m(1− s)T
n(m− s2) −
bk¯[m(1 + eˆ) + (eˆ− 1)s2]
(1 + eˆ)(m− s2) . (22)
Note that hinterland variables and the net return to capital depend only on the sum of the
cities’ tax rates (and exogenous parameters). A city’s capital stock is negatively affected
by a raise in its capital tax but increases with tax increases in other cities.
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3.2.4 Stage 1
In the first stage, all n cities determine simultaneously their tax policies {tc,i, τ c,i}i. Each
city takes in its decision the tax policy of all other cities as given, but rationally anticipates
the effects of its tax policy on its capital stock and hinterland policies in subsequent stages
as shown in (19)-(21). A city’s tax policy must also be a majority voting equilibrium. We
use the same approach as under stage 3 to argue that the preferred policy of the median
endowment person prevails. To find this policy, we maximise the utility of the median
voter with respect to tax rates, given the vector of all other cities’ tax rates. Therefore,
we have to solve
max
tc,i,τc,i
(1 + eˆ)
[
f(kc,i)− f ′(kc,i)kc,i)− τ c,i]+ (1− eˆ)ρk¯ + u((tc,ikc,i) + τ c,i), (23)
where kc,i = k(tc,i, {tc,v}) and ρ = ρ(tc,i, {tc,v}) come from (19) and (22), respectively.
Similar to (10), the derivative with respect to τ c,i, after setting equal to zero, delivers
u′(gc,i)− (1 + eˆ) = 0 and, thus, determines the public good level g. The public good level
in cities and hinterlands is the same when the endowment distribution is the same, which
we assume.
We then differentiate the utility function with respect to tc,i, replace u′ by (1 + eˆ)
and make use of the symmetric equilibrium property tc,i = tc for all i. This gives us the
equilibrium capital tax rate in a symmetric city equilibrium
tc =
2m2eˆbk¯(1− s)
(1 + eˆ) [n(m− s2)2 −m2(1− s)2] ≥ 0, (24)
and after inserting into (21) the equilibrium capital tax rate for each hinterland
th =
2eˆbk¯sn(m− s2)
(1 + eˆ) [n(m− s2)2 −m2(1− s)2] ≥ 0. (25)
To see that capital tax rates are nonnegative, it is sufficient to show that the denominators
are positive, that is n(m − s2)2 > m2(1 − s)2. This condition holds for m = 1 regardless
of the value of n (assuming n > 1). Moreover, the left hand side of the inequality is rising
faster in m than the right hand side because 2n(m− s2) > 2m(1− s)2, thus proving the
claim.
Conditions (24) and (25) are the key expressions for our further analysis as they cap-
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ture the equilibrium capital tax rates as a function of exogenous parameters, in particular
the number of hinterlands m and metropolitan regions n. All other equilibrium variables
now follow from simple substitution. In particular, the equilibrium capital stocks are
found by inserting the equilibrium capital tax rates into (19) and (20) (omitted here).
In a symmetric city equilibrium, the overall capital stock is identical in all metropolitan
regions, so that k˜i = k¯.
The tax rate conditions (24) and (25) make intuitively sense. For example, when the
parameter of the production function b is zero, production is linear in the capital-labour
ratio and thus jurisdictions compete in a Bertrand fashion. All equilibrium tax rates are
zero in this case. Taking limits with size of jurisdictions gives also clear results: Capital
tax rates of cities (hinterlands) go toward zero when the population share of hinterlands
(cities) goes to 1.
This completes the solution of the multi-stage game. We now turn to further charac-
terising the equilibrium.
3.3 Equilibrium Properties
We are particularly interested in how capital tax rates in cities and hinterlands, and
the difference of the two, change with n. We also examine the extent of the shift of
taxation from mobile to immobile factors in both types of jurisdictions. A change in n
can be interpreted as globalisation or market integration such as the fall of communism
that brought Eastern European countries into the European Union or German unification
which extended the number of metro regions that compete for similar investment under
the same political and legal system. In addition, we compare those findings to a model
where all tax policy decisions, both by cities and hinterlands, are made simultaneously
while maintaining all other assumptions. This is called the simultaneous model and is
summarised in the appendix (A.2).
We start with a limit result to demonstrate the difference between our sequential
model and a standard tax competition model in which all governments make simultaneous
choices.
Proposition 1. In the sequential model, the equilibrium capital tax rate of a city tc
converges to zero for n → ∞, while the tax rate of a hinterland jurisdiction is bounded
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above zero and converges to 2eˆbk¯s
(1+eˆ)(m−s2) > 0. In the simultaneous model, capital tax rates
of all jurisdictions converge to zero when the number of metropolitan regions becomes
very large.
Proof: The convergence to zero of the city tax rate follows immediately from (24).
Using l’Hôpital’s rule, the hinterland’s tax rate converges to the value provided in the
Proposition. The results for the simultaneous model are proven in the appendix.
The limit result should not be interpreted literally because in practice the number of
metropolitan areas is not infinite. Still, local business tax rates even in small localities in
Germany are clearly positive, although the number of potential competitors can be fairly
large (evidence on local tax rates is provided in section 4). This points to the usefulness
of the sequential model, in which hinterland communities compete only in the geographic
neighbourhood.
In addition to the limit result, we study whether capital tax rates are monotonic in
the number of metropolitan regions. Our result show that an increase in n affects cities
and hinterlands differentially.
Proposition 2. In the sequential model, all capital tax rates in a symmetric equilib-
rium fall with n, but the capital tax rates of hinterlands fall less than the city’s capital
tax; that is,
0 >
dth
dn
>
dtc
dn
.
The proof for falling capital tax rates follows from differentiation of (24) and (25). To
see that the city’s tax rate falls more, combine (24) and (25) to obtain
tc − th = 2eˆbk¯[m
2(1− s)− sn(m− s2)]
(1 + eˆ) [n(m− s2)2 −m2(1− s)2] , (26)
which is decreasing in n as the numerator falls and the denominator rises in n. The tax
differential (26) also shows that it is not a priori determined whether a city or hinterland
has the higher tax. For small m and high n a hinterland has the higher capital tax, while
the reverse is true when n is small relative to m and s takes on a low value. More on this
aspect is discussed in section 3.4 when we analyse the model numerically.
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In the appendix, we show that in the simultaneous model the derivative d(tc− th)/dn
can be positive or negative, and with the help of numerical simulations often close to
zero in absolute value and small in comparison to the derivative in the sequential model
with the same parameter values. In other words, an increase in n has a similar effect on
capital tax rates in cities and hinterlands in the simultaneous model, while hinterlands
are somewhat more sheltered than cities in the sequential model. In section 4, we argue
on the basis of actual tax data that the sequential model seems to better fit the trend in
local business tax rates in Germany.
We have seen that our sequential model behaves differently from the simultaneous
model when it comes to the relationship between capital tax rates and number of metropoli-
tan regions. At the same time, the sequential model reproduces important results from
the earlier literature. In particular, changes in the size of jurisdictions have the following
effects: An increase in the population size of all hinterlands in a region, s, lowers the tax
rate of cities. This follows from differentiation of (24) with respect to s.15 The effect on the
capital tax rate of hinterlands is theoretically ambiguous due to the nonlinear structure,
but in all numerical simulations the hinterland tax rates rise with s.
We now consider the shift in taxation from mobile to immobile factors, that is, the
difference between the capital and labour tax rate ∆ = t− τ, both for a typical city and
a hinterland. In standard tax competition models more competition leads to a shift from
taxation of mobile factors to immobile factors. This is also the case in the sequential
model as the following results demonstrate.
Proposition 3. In the sequential model, for both cities and hinterlands the tax rate
gap between the tax on mobile capital and immobile labour, ∆r = tr − τ r, r = c, h, is
falling in the number of metropolitan areas n.
Proof: See appendix (A.3).
Proposition 3 demonstrates that both cities and hinterlands shift from capital tax
rates to land tax rates when external competition increases. In the next section 3.4, we
15The derivative is
dtc
ds
=
n(m− s2)[4s(1− s)− (m− s2)]−m2(1− s)2
[n(m− s2)2 −m2(1− s)2]2 ,
which is negative if the term in square brackets in the numerator is negative. This is the case, as it is
negative for s = 2/3, which is the value that maximises the square bracket.
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go beyond the qualitative effect and analyse numerically for which type of jurisdiction the
shift is larger. This will be important for our comparison to real world tax data from the
German state of Baden-Württemberg considered in section 4.
We now ask a related question: Do governments rely more on labour taxes in terms
of revenues? We therefore define the following revenue gap:
Γr = trkr − τ r, r = c, h (27)
and notice that τ is both the labour tax rate as well as labour tax revenue in per capita
terms. Using again the government budget constraint, we can write Γr = 2trkr − g. For
a city, this term is declining in n as
dΓc
dn
= 2
(
kc + tc
dkc
dtc
)
dtc
dn
< 0,
based on the arguments provided in the proof of Proposition 3. For hinterlands, the result
is less straightforward. Notice that we can write the hinterland’s capital stock based on
(20) in a symmetric equilibrium as
kh =
(m− s)(1− s)tc
b(m− s2) +
k¯[m(1 + eˆ) + s2(eˆ− 1)− 2eˆs]
(m− s2)(1 + eˆ) ,
where tc is given by (24). Hence, kh increases with the cities’ capital tax rates (dkh/dtc >
0) and we can write the derivative with respect to n as follows:
dΓh
dn
= 2
(
kh
dth
dn
+ tc
dkh
dtc
dtc
dn
)
< 0,
because all capital tax rates decline in n. We summarise in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. In the sequential model, an increase in n leads to more tax revenue
collected from the immobile factor (labour) and less from the mobile factor (capital) in
both cities and hinterlands.
Propositions 3 and 4 are consistent with results from standard tax competition models.
Yet, the mechanism differs due to the sequential structure, which gives rise to indirect
effects as in the proof of Proposition 4.
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3.4 Numerical Example
In the following, we present a numerical example to illustrate and complement our an-
alytical results, in particular Propositions 2 and 3. Comparative static results from the
numerical example can also be compared to real world tax data as done in section 4.
We assign a specific subutility function for the public good, u(g) = ln(g), in order to
calculate the public good provision level and the tax rates on labour, τ c and τh. From
a hinterland’s first order condition (10), and similar for a city from stage 2, we obtain
the per capita provision level of the public good in c and h: g = 1
1+eˆ
. Substituting this
value back into the government budget constraint, the labour tax rates are found to be
τ c = 1
1+eˆ
− tckc and τh = 1
1+eˆ
− thkh, where the capital tax rates are taken from (24)
and (25), respectively, and the capital stocks follow from (19) and (20) after appropriate
substitutions. Together, these values allow us to calculate the tax rate gap between the
capital and labour tax rate, ∆ = t− τ .
Table 2: Numerical example
tc th τc τh ∆c ∆h
1. s=0.05, m=10, n=2 0.5776 0.0061 0.1056 0.6573 0.4720 -0.6512
2. s=0.05, m=10, n=50 0.0129 0.0034 0.6538 0.6632 -0.6409 -0.6598
3. s=0.3, m=10, n=50 0.0096 0.0204 0.6570 0.6464 -0.6474 -0.6261
4. s=0.05, m=2, n=50 0.0129 0.01700 0.6537 0.6497 -0.6408 -0.6327
5. s=0.3, m=2, n=50 0.0103 0.1058 0.6560 0.5679 -0.6457 -0.4620
Other parameters: k¯=1, b=1, eˆ=0.5
We now go beyond Proposition 3 by analysing how the tax rate gap changes in cities
relative to hinterlands, that is d∆c/dn and d∆h/dn. In addition, we also compare the
absolute level of capital tax rates in the two types of jurisdictions, i.e. we evaluate the
sign of (26) as function of n. We vary the values for the overall population size of the
hinterlands relative to the city, s, the number of hinterlands in a metropolitan area, m,
and the number of metropolitan regions, n. All other parameter values are held constant
and chosen as reported in the table below. Table 2 shows that the tax rate gap in a city
∆c can be higher or lower than the gap in a hinterland ∆h. The gap in the city is smaller
(higher in absolute terms) when s and n are sufficiently high (lines 3 and 5) and/or m is
sufficiently low (line 4). Furthermore, a decrease in the size of each hinterland relative to
the city – either through a smaller overall population size of the hinterlands s for a given
number of hinterlands, or an increasing number of hinterlands m for given population size
– leads in the hinterland to a shift from distortionary capital taxation to non-distortionary
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labour taxation. The corresponding effect for cities, however, differs (the city’s capital
tax decreases for increasing m – compare lines 4 and 3 – while for decreasing s the city’s
tax may increase – see lines 3 and 2).
Obviously, doing the reverse exercise, namely making a city smaller in population size
(i.e. s increases) leads to the same qualitative outcome: a shift from capital taxation
to non-distortionary labour taxation in a city. Yet, this does not imply that the smaller
jurisdiction always makes less use of capital taxation than the bigger ones as lines 3 to 5
in table 2 demonstrate. This result contrasts with the finding of the model by Bucovetsky
(2009), in which smaller jurisdictions always make less use of the distortionary taxation
than larger ones.
Figure 3: Simulation results
n is displayed on the x-axis. Parameters: k¯=1, b=1, eˆ=0.5, m=3
The dependency of capital tax rates and tax rate gaps in cities and hinterlands on the
number of metropolitan regions n is visualised in figure 3. After making use of the same
parameter values as before in the table notes, we plot the capital tax rates and the tax rate
gaps in city and hinterland as function of the number of metropolitan regions, n, for the
case of a small city (s=0.4) and a large city (s=0.1), respectively. The steeper line belongs
to a city and is in all of our simulations steeper than the one for the hinterland. Moreover,
the two lines intersect, which means that for a low number of external competitors, the
cities have the higher capital tax rate and the higher tax rate gap than the hinterlands,
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while the opposite is true for a high number of n, as then hinterlands rely more strongly on
capital taxation. However, when the city gets bigger relative to the hinterlands (s=0.1),
the city’s curve is shifted upwards and the hinterland’s curve is shifted downwards. This
reflects the size effect discussed before and leads to a shift of the intersection to the right;
i.e., in this case, the city undercuts the hinterlands’ capital tax rates only for a very high
number of metro regions n. Figure 3 is important for our comparison with real world tax
data in Germany, which we will discuss next.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
In our theoretical analysis, we have demonstrated that two different effects interact in
our model of local tax competition. First, we have observed a pure size effect, which is
well-known from the literature of asymmetric tax competition. This suggests that the
smaller jurisdictions rely less on capital taxation than bigger ones. Second, this effect
is offset through external competition from cities in other metropolitan regions. Since
cities react stronger to external competition than hinterlands, an increase in the number
of competitors, as indicated by an increasing n, implies a stronger shift to the use of
immobile tax bases in the cities than in the hinterlands. Consequently, given a sufficient
large number of competitors, the cities might actually make less use of capital taxation
than their hinterlands.
We now check the plausibility of our theoretical predictions by describing actual taxes
set in the state of Baden-Württemberg, the state on which our survey in section 2 was
based. This requires a slight reinterpretation of our theoretical model as the most im-
portant autonomous tax instruments (and revenue sources) for jurisdictions in Baden-
Württemberg are the local business tax rate (“Gewerbesteuer”) and a land tax (“Grund-
steuer B”). The former matches well the capital tax rate in our theoretical model. The
latter, however, obviously differs from the labour tax that we assumed in section 3 (local
jurisdictions in Baden-Württemberg do not control their own income or labour tax). Nev-
ertheless, the land tax is qualitatively similar to the labour tax in that it is likely to be
less distortionary than the local business tax.16 To sustain the applicability of the model,
16Note that in the real world the German land tax is also levied on business land so that it theoretically
also affects the capital allocation. Quantitatively, however, the land tax mainly affects private land
owners, so that it is much less relevant for location decisions of firms than the local business tax.
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and in particular the nature of the political equilibrium, we would also need to assume a
monotonic relationship between the size of land and its population. While this may be
considered unrealistic in a narrow sense, we feel that our theoretical model captures the
qualitative setting in Baden-Württemberg well: There are two tax instruments available,
one on a mobile factor and another one on a fixed factor, which is the less distortionary
tax.
Figure 4: Development of taxes in Baden-Württemberg
The upper graph in figure 4 presents the development of the collection rates (“Hebesätze”)
of the local business tax for jurisdictions of different size (groups). We view the period
from 1990 to 2008 as one where external competition increased due to globalisation in
general and the Eastern enlargement of the EU and German unification in particular.
Figure 4 shows that local business tax rates in small communities grew over the last
twelve years, while they were fairly stable in the 20 largest cities. The finding of rising
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business taxes is neither consistent with our Proposition 2, which shows that capital tax
rates are monotonically decreasing in n, nor with the empirical literature cited above,
which suggests a race to the bottom of capital tax rates due to increasing competition
and spatial interactions. Yet, we believe that other reasons are causing an increase in
need of financial resources (and, hence, an increase of all types of taxes), such as man-
dated shifts of responsibilities from higher level governments to local communities for
social welfare policies, the inclusion of the (poorer) Eastern German states in the federal
fiscal equalisation systems or an offset for lower corporate tax rates at the national level.
Consequently, we believe that the tax rate gap – expressed as the collection rate of the
business tax minus the collection rate of the land tax – is the more meaningful measure
for comparison.
In the lower graph of figure 4, the trends for the tax rate gaps are depicted. Over the
observation period, the tax gap decreased in all size classes, that is the business tax rates
were lowered in relation to the land taxes.17 This drop is in line with reductions in cor-
porate tax rates at national levels, which arise from increasing external competition (see
e.g., Slemrod, 2004). In the light of our model, globalisation-related changes – such as the
reduction in transport costs and institutional openings of markets to other countries, e.g.
the Eastern enlargement of the EU – allowed for the entry of more-distant jurisdictions in
the competition for capital. Consequently, competitive pressures on cities in Germany in-
creased and forced local decision-makers to resort more to non-distortionary land taxes.18
Most notably, the development of the tax gaps in the beginning and mid-1990s is re-
markable. At that time, German cities were confronted with the emergence of a huge
number of new competitors after the fall of the iron curtain and German reunification
(the negative impact of the former on international corporate tax levels is documented
by Overesch and Rincke, 2009). Consequently, the sharp drop in local tax gaps coincides
with the view that the competition with external competitors – expressed as the number
of regions in our model – increased especially in the 1990s.
Yet, different types of jurisdictions were unequally affected by this development. Ini-
17The interpretation of the levels of the measure needs to be done with care as the two tax bases are
not directly comparable. Rather, we see this gap as a qualitative measure for shifts from one tax base to
the other.
18Part of the common drop can also be explained by institutional characteristics of the two taxes since
the tax base of the land tax is levied on predetermined land prices, which are adjusted very little over
time. Since the revenues of the business tax tend to increase in nominal terms over time, the rate of the
land tax has to be raised regularly in order to keep the revenue ratio constant.
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tially, the tax gaps were rather similar in urban centres and rural areas; but in the course
of time, this pattern changed markedly. In particular the biggest cities – as well as urban
centres from the first size decile – tended to decrease their business tax rates relative to
the land tax rates much stronger than the smaller jurisdictions. This finding is well in line
with the theoretical predictions made above (see Figure 3): The increasing pressure from
external competition pushes down the ratio of capital to land taxes in all jurisdictions,
but this effect is much stronger for urban centres.
These findings give support to our theoretical predictions – big cities might actually
rely less on corporate taxation – which are in contrast to research which has shown that
smaller countries and countries on the periphery have lower corporate tax rates than large
countries or regions in the core (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Haufler et al., 2009; Haufler
and Wooton, 2010). This discrepancy to earlier literature can be explained with some
special characteristics of local tax competition. In our view, competition between geo-
graphically close jurisdictions is qualitatively different from competition among countries
or states. At the local level, but not the country or state level, it is relatively easy for
a firm to benefit from the agglomeration benefits and infrastructure of an urban centre
even in smaller jurisdictions, as long as they are located within a reasonable distance to
the urban centre.
We conclude by emphasising the importance of considering asymmetries, in particular
concerning the structure of competition in local tax competition. Not all jurisdictions
are identical and, consequently, the perceived pressures from competition differ between
jurisdictions, as we have demonstrated. This has important implications for the theoretical
modelling of tax competition. We believe that accounting for differences in a jurisdiction’s
involvement in levels of competition is an important innovation compared to the existing
theoretical literature on local tax competition. Clearly, much work needs to be done to
better understand the structure of local tax competition.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data
Figure 5: Map of Baden-Württemberg
Small (big) points indicate the location of secondary (regional) centres.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
Perception: Survey response 1.98 1.88 -4 4 own survey
competition within state
Perception: competition Survey response -1.20 2.27 -4 4 own survey
with other states
Perception: competition Survey response -1.91 2.42 -4 4 own survey
with other countries
Regional centre Dummy = 1 if classified as 0.02 0.14 0 1 LEP 2002
regional centre
Secondary centre Dummy = 1 if classified 0.10 0.30 0 1 LEP 2002
as regional centre
State border Dummy = 1 if municipality shares 0.07 0.26 0 1 own
border with another German state calculations
Country border Dummy = 1 if municipality shares 0.05 0.21 0 1 own
border with another country calculations
Mayor Dummy = 1 if survey 0.48 0.50 0 1 own survey
was responded by the mayor
Inhabitants (log) Log of number of inhabitants 8.71 0.98 5.81 13.30 Statistical
Office BW
(Stala)
Share left Share of left-wing parties 0.19 0.15 0 0.71 Stala
at municipal election 2004
Share free voters Share of free voters 0.46 0.30 0 1 Stala
at municipal election 2004
High contribution rate Dummy = 1 if fiscal capacity 0.39 0.49 0 1 Stala
below 60% of average
Medium contribution rate Dummy = 1 if fiscal capacity 0.52 0.50 0 1 Stala
between 60% and 100% of average
Population working age Share of inhabitants 0.66 0.02 0.57 0.74 Stala
between 15 and 65 years
Unemployed Share of unemployed 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 Stala
Fiscal equalisation system: It has to be assumed that municipalities with a higher
contribution rate – i.e. the extent to which a decrease in the tax base increases the
received transfers – perceive a lower pressure from competition. These municipalities
are compensated more strongly by the equalisation system for any capital outflows they
experience. In particular, we are able to identify three groups of jurisdictions which differ
highly in their level of marginal contribution rates; they are captured by dummy variables
in our regressions. This identification is possible due to discontinuities in the regulations
that determine the marginal contribution rate as discussed by Buettner (2006).
Ideological bias: We add the share of seats taken by left-wing parties as well as the
free voters in the local council in order to capture the political preferences of the jurisdic-
tion. Moreover, in several cases the mayors delegated the completion of the questionnaire
to the responsible staff of the administration, so that not the perception of the directly-
elected mayor, and thus a politician, was recorded, but that of his bureaucracy. Hence,
we insert a dummy for responses given by the mayors in order to control for possible
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differences between these two groups of individuals.
A.2 The Simultaneous Game
The simultaneous game consists of two stages only. In the first stage, governments from
cities and hinterlands simultaneously choose their tax policy, where in each jurisdiction
tax policy must be a majority voting equilibrium for a given fiscal policy in all other
regions. In the second stage, capital is allocated between all cities and all hinterlands
depending on the respective capital tax rates of all jurisdictions {tc,i, th,ij}. We use the
same notation as in section 3. The capital market equilibrium condition is
(1− s)
∑
i
kc,i +
s
m
∑
i
∑
j
kh,ij = nk¯. (A1)
In equilibrium the net return to capital, ρ = f ′(k)− t, has to be the same across all cities,
and across any city and its hinterlands:
ρ = a− bkc,i − tc,i = a− bkc,l − tc,l = a− bkh,ij − th,ij, (A2)
for all i, l = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ...,m. Solving (A2) for kc,l and kh,ij, respectively, and then
substituting in the capital market equilibrium condition (A1) gives
kc,i = k¯ − (n− 1 + s)t
ci
nb
+
(1− s)T−i
nb
+
s
nmb
(
m∑
j=1
thij
)
(A3)
kh,ij = k¯ +
(1− s)T
nb
+
s
∑n
l=1
∑m
v=1 t
h,lv
nmb
− t
h,ij
b
,
where T is the sum of all cities’ capital tax rates and T−i = T − tc,i. It is easy to see that
a jurisdiction’s capital stock is declining in its own tax rate:
dkc,i
dtc,i
= −(n− 1 + s)
nb
< 0 (A4)
dkh,ij
dth,ij
=
(s− nm)
bnm
< 0. (A5)
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Furthermore, dρ/dtc,i = −b·dkc,i/dtc,i−1 and similar for a change in a hinterland’s capital
tax rate.
In a symmetric equilibrium where all hinterlands choose the same tax and all cities
choose the same tax, (A4) and (A5) simplify to
kc = k¯ +
s(th − tc)
b
(A6)
kh = k¯ +
(1− s)(tc − th)
b
. (A7)
We now move to the analysis of the first stage. The reaction function of a typical
hinterland jurisdiction and a typical city can be determined in a similar fashion as in
stages 1 and 3 of the sequential game. For example, the two first order conditions for the
utility maximisation of the median voter in hinterland j in region i are:
(1 + ê)
(
−f ′′(kh,ij)∂k
h,ij
∂th,ij
kh,ij
)
+ (1− ê)
(
∂ρ
∂th,ij
k¯
)
+ u′(gh,ij) ·
(
kh,ij + th,ij
∂kh,ij
∂th,ij
)
= 0
(A8)
u′(gh,ij)− (1 + ê) = 0
The same qualitative conditions hold for a city.
Substituting (A3) into (A8), imposing symmetry among hinterlands as well as among
cities (so that (A6) and (A7) apply), and using comparative statics reported in (A4) and
(A5), we obtain the equilibrium tax rate for the city and hinterland as
tc =
2nmêbk¯(1− s)
(1 + ê) [(nm− s2)(n− 1 + s(2− s))− (1− s2)2] (A9)
th =
(
1
nm− s2
)[
2êbk¯s
(1 + ê)
+ s(1− s)tc
]
, (A10)
where th contains tc to write the hinterland’s tax more compactly.
We now characterise properties of the equilibrium tax policy in the simultaneous game,
which are similar in nature to the results presented for the sequential model in section
3. First, the city tax rate converges towards zero when n goes to infinity because the
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numerator in (A9) is linear in n, while the denominator is quadratic in n. This is in line
with Prop. 1. A difference arises for hinterland communities. When n goes to infinity, th
converges to zero because tc goes to zero and the denominator in round brackets goes to
infinity.
We next consider how the difference in capital tax rates, tc−th, responds to changes in
n. In the sequential game, we know from Prop. 2 that this derivative is negative. In the
simultaneous game, however, this derivative can be positive or negative. To obtain more
insights, write the city and hinterland capital tax rates more compactly as tc = A1 ≥ 0 and
th = A2+A3t
c ≥ 0, where A2 ≡ 2êbk¯s/((1+ê)(nm−s2) ≥ 0 and A3 ≡ s(1−s)/(nm−s2) ≥
0. From here it follows that tc − th = A1(1− A3)− A2 and, thus,
d(tc − th)
dn
= (1− A3)dA1
dn
− A1dA3
dn
− dA2
dn
. (A11)
Note that the derivatives in the second and third term of (A11) are negative, so that the
sum of these two effects is positive. By contrast, the city’s tax rate is typically declining
in n, and 1−A3 = (nm− s)/(nm− s2) > 0, so that the first effect is negative. Numerical
simulations (not reported) show that the net effect can be positive or negative. The
case of a positive derivative is most easily seen when s converges towards 1 as dA1/dn
and dA3/dn then go to zero, while dA2/dn is bounded above zero. While such a high
value of the hinterlands’ population share may seem unrealistic, it nevertheless points to
an important difference to the sequential model. Moreover, numerical simulations (not
reported) also show that regardless of the sign of (A11) the derivative is small in absolute
value and in comparison to the sequential model. This becomes clear when examining the
terms A1, A2, A3 and their derivatives with respect to n, which all have a higher order of
n (or a product of n and m) in the denominator than in the numerator, so that even for
“reasonable” parameter values of m and n the derivative (A11) becomes small in absolute
value.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider first the tax gap in a hinterland jurisdiction
∆h = th − τh = th − (gh − thkh) = th(1 + kh)− gh, (A12)
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where we made use of the government budget constraint to substitute for the labour tax.
Recall that the public good level gh is independent of the number of jurisdictions and
depends only on the median’s endowment position. This allows us to focus on the first
term in (A12). Because th falls, ∆h is decreasing in n if kh is declining in n. Condition
(20) shows that kh equals a constant plus a term that is proportional in the sum of
cities’ capital tax rates. The direct effect of n in the first term of (20) vanishes after
realising that in a symmetric city equilibrium T = ntc. As the city tax rate falls in n,
and kh depends positively on tc, the capital use in hinterlands must fall with competition.
Hence, d∆h/dn < 0.
Next consider a city’s tax gap ∆c = tc−τ c = tc(1+kc)−gc. Because gc is not changing
with n, we get
d∆c
dn
=
[
1 + kc + tc
dkc
dtc
]
dtc
dn
+ tc
∂kc
∂n
. (A13)
From Proposition 2 we know that tc is falling in n. Hence, the tax difference in cities
is declining if the term in square brackets is positive and the last term in (A13) is non-
positive. Consider first the direct effect of n on a city’s capital stock (the last term in
(A13)). Imposing symmetry among cities, the capital stock of a city (19) can be written
as
kc =
s(s−m)tc
b(m− s2) +
k¯(m(1 + eˆ) + (eˆ− 1)s2)
(1 + eˆ)(m− s2) ,
which does not depend on n directly, i.e. ∂kc/∂n = 0. We are thus left with the first
term in (A13). The square bracket is positive for n toward infinity as tc converges to zero
(Prop. 1) as long as the derivative dkc/dtc is finite. The latter derivative represents the
total change of a city’s capital stock to all cities changing their capital tax rates.
To examine the square bracket more generally, consider the sum of the second and third
term in square brackets, kc+tc ·dkc/dtc, which looks like the slope of a government revenue
curve. The difference to the typical Laffer curve of a city is that here the total effect of a
change in capital tax rates of all cities is considered when n increases. If we assume for now
that each city is on the left side of its own Laffer curve, so that kc,i + tc,i · (∂kc,i/∂tc,i) > 0,
then the sum of the second and third term of the square bracket in (A13) must be positive
as well when all cities change their tax rate (dkc/dtc =
∑
i ∂k
c,i/∂tc,i), as now the loss in
tax base for an individual city is smaller if all cities increase their taxes. This becomes
evident from (A13), where the derivative of the city’s capital stock with respect to all
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other cities’ capital tax rates is positive, i.e. dkc,i/dT−i =
∑
υ 6=i ∂k
c,i/∂tc,υ > 0 and,
hence, kc,i + tc,i dkc
dtc
= kc,i + tc,i( dk
c,i
dT−i + ∂k
c,i/∂tc,i) > kc,i + tc,i(∂kc,i/∂tc,i) > 0.
We assumed above that a city is on the left-hand side of its Laffer curve, which must
hold because otherwise the city could choose a lower tax rate that would generate the same
public good level, lead to a higher net return to capital and higher private consumption.
This completes the proof.
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